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Comments
AUTOMOBILES-THE COMMUNITY ERRAND AND THE
FAMILY PURPOSE DOCTRINE
The advent of the family automobile, coupled with the pecul-
iar dangers and financial responsibilities incurred in its use, has
rCsulItcd in the adoption of a doctrine, called the "family purpose"
doctrine, which places the solvency of the family head behind the
wrongdoings of the dependent members of his family.' Under this
theory the owner who permits members of his family to drive his
car for their pleasure makes the driver's pleasure his "business"
and thus the driver becomes his servant. To be held liable, the
owner must either own the automobile or have a property inter-
est in it.' The driver must also be a member of the owner's im-
mediate family' with either express or implied permission' to
drive the automobile.
A substantial number of the American courts reject this
doctrine, however, and consider it a "fictitious agency without
any basis in fact."' This attitude is supported by the fact that
this liability is restricted to automobiles.'
Louisiana has expressly rejected the "family purpose" doc-
trine' on the ground that liability for damages in Louisiana must
clearly be expressed or implied from the articles of the code. The
courts have interpreted Articles 2315-2320, dealing with offenses
and quasi offenses, as not recognizing the liability upon which
the doctrine is based. Actually Louisiana courts, as well as the
courts which recognize the "family purpose" doctrine, proceed
from the same starting point-that the master is liable for the
torts of his servant; but the Louisiana courts have been unwilling
1. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) 500-501.
2. Id. at 501; Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the Family Automobile
(1928) 26 Mich. L. Rev. 846.
3. Holland v. Goode, 188 Ky. 525, 222 S.W. 950 (1920); Emanuelson v.
Johnson, 148 Minn. 417, 182 N.W. 521 (1921).
4. Smart v. Bissonette, 106 Conn. 447, 138 Atl. 365 (1927); Lattin, supra
note 2.
5. Sale v. Atkins, 206 ICy. 224, 267 S. W. 223 (1924); Dow v. Legg, 120 Neb.
271, 231 N. W. 747, 74 A.L.R. 5 (1930).
6. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1, at 502.
7. Felcyn v. Gamble, 185 Minn. 357, 241 N. W. 37 (1932).
8. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Quesenberry & Wife, 1 La. App. 364 (1924);
Davis v. Shaw, 142 So. 301 (La. App. 1932); Tuck v. Harmon, 151 So. 803 (La.
App. 1934); Benton v. Griffith, 184 So. 371 (La. App. 1938).
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to extend the agency theory to the extent necessary to recognize
liability in the instances under consideration.
Although Louisiana courts refuse to recognize the broad
"family purpose" doctrine of the common law it is not improbable
that the same search for a solvent defendant has led the courts
of Louisiana to develop a similar doctrine based on a theory of
"community errand." Under this doctrine, if the wife is driving
with the express or implied consent of her husband, on an errand
for the community, the husband as head and master is liable. But,
if the wife's mission is for her own pleasure or convenience, or
if she is driving without her husband's consent, the community is
not liable.
The leading Louisiana case on this subject, Adams v. Golson,11
established the principle of liability of the husband for the tort
of the wife when the latter is acting as the agent of the com-
munity. In order to hold the husband liable as head and master
the wife must be either expressly or impliedly authorized to and
actually attending to the business of the community. Since a man-
date may not be created in the interest of the mandatary alone,'"
the use of the community automobile for the wife's pleasure can-
not establish such a relationship.
Because the plaintiff's right of action against the husband de-
pends principally upon the character of the wife's mission, it is
important to determine how particular errands have been desig-
nated by the courts. If the wife is shopping for the household,
she is engaged in a community errand, since this involves the ex-
penditure of funds for the benefit of the community. This was
extended in Paderas v. Stauffer" to include any errand for select-
ing clothes, hats, or "any of the numberless things that a woman
requires for her own comfort and adornment." 2 Other examples
of community errands are trips to the wife's dressmaker 3 or to
repair furniture used in the community household." Personal er-
rands, for which no liability attaches, include any trip made for
9. 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
10. Art. 2986, La. Civil Code of 1870; Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 174
So. 876 (1937).
11. 120 So. 886 (La. App. 1929).
12. 120 So. 886, 887.
13. Levy v. New Orleans and Northeastern Ry., 20 So.(2d) 559 (La. App.
1945).
14. Meibaum v. Campisi, 16 So.(2d) 257 (La. App. 1944).
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the wife's enjoyment, such as a "joy ride,"'" attending a style
show", or fraternal meeting," or a visit to her relatives.1"
The recent court of appeal case of Levy v. New Orleans
and Northeastern Railway"' makes a departure from the pre-
vious jurisprudence on the liability of the husband. The court
stated: "We see no reason why if the husband either expressly or
by implication authorizes the wife to use the car for her own
pleasure, the community and the husband as its head, should not
be liable for her negligence. 2 1 After stating that it had no inten-
tion to engage in the "futile pastime of a disagreeing" with the
Golson case, the court interpreted that decision as relieving the
husband from liability only when the wife is unauthorizedly driv-
ing the car. Several decisions prior to the Golson case express
views similar to those in the Levy case. In Tarleton-Gaspard v.
Malochee2l the wife was driving her parents to a movie, which
was clearly a personal mission. Nevertheless, the husband was
held liable because the court considered that under the circum-
stances his wife was just as much his agent as the family chauf-
feur. The opinion of another case in which the husband was held
liable apparently did not attach sufficient importance to the er-
rand to warrant its mention.2 It seems, therefore, that at one
time the court was prepared to reach the same result attained
under the "family purpose" doctrine insofar as the husband-wife
relationship is concerned.
The court has correctly placed the burden of proving the na-
ture of the errand on the husband. This seems justified since the
matter is normally "completely and exclusively" within his
knowledge.2 3 In order to escape liability the husband must, there-
fore, sustain the burden of proof either that the automobile was
not being used in the interest of the community at the time of the
accident,24 or that it was being used without his consent. 2
15. Durel v. Flach, 1 La. App. 758 (1925).
16. Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
17. Ibid.
18. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Simms, 200 So. 34 (La. App. 1941).
19. 20 So.(2d) 559 (La. App. 1945), noted in (1946) 20 Tulane L. Rev. 279.
20. 20 So.(2d) 559, 568.
21. 16 La. App. 527, 133 Sb, 409 (1931).
22. Battalora v. Carnahan Creamery, 157 So. 612 (La. App. 1934).
23. Paderas v. Stauffer, 120 So. 886 (La. App. 1929).
24. Levy v. New Orleans and Northeastern Ry., 20 So.(2d) 559 (La. App.
1945).
25. Wise v. Smith, 186 So. 857 (La. App. 1939); Maibaum v. Campisi, 16
So.(2d) 257 (La. App. 1944).
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When the wife's mission includes both community business
and pleasure, the question then arises as to which purpose shall
control. In the Golson case the wife had driven the community
automobile with her husband's consent to attend a style show
and a meeting of a fraternal organization. The accident occurred
while she was en route to a restaurant for her evening meal. The
court held that the main purpose of Mrs. Golson's trip was to
attend the show and meeting for her own pleasure and the meal
was merely incidental to the principal use of the automobile. The
importance of determination is illustrated by Aetna Casualty &
Surety Company v. Simms.1 In this case the wife entered the
car for the purpose of visiting her aunt, but upon having trouble
with the switch key she decided to drive to a garage to have it
repaired. The accident occurred while she was trying to nego-
tiate an entrance at the latter place. Under these facts the court
concluded that the primary purpose for using the car was the
personal mission; and, therefore, since the repair of the key was
merely secondary to the main object, the husband was not re-
sponsible.
Under the traditional civil law theory of individual rights
and liabilities the husband has never been held responsible for
his wife's torts committed out of his presence.2 7 The Civil Code
contains no provision specifically rendering the husband liable
merely because of the marital relationship.28 The jurisprudence
has established this doctrine and a question arises as to its de-
sirability. The injured plaintiff in many instances would be'left
with a vacant right if the wife did not possess sufficient separate
funds to satisfy a judgment. The effect upon the wife would other-
wise work an injustice in certain instances. In those cases where
the wife has sufficient separate property to satisfy the plaintiff's
claim, the entire amount is taken from her separate funds; where-
as the husband may liquidate his liability from community funds.
In administering this doctrine difficulties are encountered not only
in ascertaining what errands are community or separate but also
in determining where the trips include several purposes, which
is the primary one.
26. 200 So. 34 (La. App. 1941).
27. Art. 2317, French Civil Code. McClure v. McMartin, 104 La. 496, 29
So. 227 (1901); Durel v. Flach, 1 La. App. 758 (1925); Adams v. Golson, 187
La. 303, 174 So. 876 (1937); 1 Pothier, A Treatise on the Law of Obligations
or Contracts (3rd ed. 1853) c. vi, § viii, art. 11, p. 362; Daggett, The Oklahoma
Community Property Act-A Comparative Study (1940) 2 LoUISIANA LAW
R~viEw 575, 583.
28. Tuck v, Harmon, 151 So. 803 (La. App. 1934).
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Under the present doctrine, in order to hold the community
liable the wife must be engaged in the business of the community
with her husband's consent; but the community is liable for the
husband's negligence although his mission is one for his own
pleasure. It would appear that the same rule should apply to both
husband and wife under the present day conditions, since the
community owes to the wife as well as to the husband the duty
of furnishing recreation and pleasure. 9 Since the wife actually
has a vested half interest3l) in the community, a more desirable re-
sult would be reached by holding the community liable for her
negligence in all instances, as in the case of the husband.
Because of the peculiar danger to individuals and property
resulting from the use of the automobile, as much responsibility
as possible should be placed behind its use. The desirability of
such a situation in order to meet present day social, economic,
and mechanical changes is evidenced by the development of the
"family purpose" doctrine elsewhere. This result can be attained
in Louisiana by adherence to the approach taken in the Levy case.
Article 2318 imposes liability upon the parents for the torts
of their minor or unemanicipated children residing with them.
If these requisites are present, the father and, after his death, the
mother are virtually insurers against the wrongs committed by
their children.
The parents' liability for the negligence of minors while driv-
ing automobiles is greater in Louisiana in some respects than
would be recognized under the "family purpose" doctrine. Under
that doctrine the minor must at least have the implied permissive
use of the parent, but in this state liability will be imposed al-
though the parent had expressly forbidden the use of the auto-
mobile. The "family purpose" doctrine also requires that the
family owner have at least a property interest in the motor ve-
hicle,31 but in Louisiana the ownership of the vehicle does not
alter the result. On the other hand, several aspects of the "family
purpose" doctrine impose liability which is not recognized in this
state. For example, in Louisiana the parent is not responsible for
the negligence of an emancipated minor,12 whereas under the
"family purpose" system the owner is responsible although the
29. Levy v. New Orleans and Northeastern Ry., 20 So.(2d) 559 (La. App.
1945).
30. Succession of Wiener, 203 La. 649, 14 So.(2d) 475 (1943).
31. Hilland v. Goode, 188 Ky. 525. 222 S.W. 950 (1920); Emanuelson v.
Johnson, 148 Minn. 417, 182 N.W. 512 (1924).
32. Stough v. Young, 185 So. 476 (La. App. 1938).
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son is an adult.3 Liability in Louisiana is also restricted to the
parents, but under the common law doctrine the owner may be
another member of the family. The purpose of Article 2318 ap-
parently is to place the parent's solvency behind his minor's
wrongs."
If the minor permits a third person to drive the automobile
entrusted to him, his parent is liable if the minor is present in
the automobile and exercised control over the driving', or if the
car was surrendered to an incompetent driver. Liability, however,
will not attach where control is surrendered to a competent driver
and the minor exercises no supervision.3 " In the "family purpose'
jurisdictions practically the same result is reached in most of the
cases, for generally the family owner will be responsible for the
negligent act of the third party committed in the presence of the
member of the family who has borrowed the car.37 No provision
of our code authorizes a minor to bind himself for the torts of
another and recovery is not based on a theory of agency. If the
minor is not guilty in this situation of any offense or quasi offense,
the parent is not liable.
Of course, if any member of the family is in fact acting as the
agent of the owner, the latter will be responsible upon ordinary
agency principles. Thus, even in the case of emancipated or major
children the parent is frequently made liable."' Where the owner
merely lends his motor vehicle to a member of his family for the
borrower's own pleasure, however, an agency relationship is not
thereby established, and there can be no liability, except as above
indicated.3 9
LAWRENCE B. SANDOZ, JR.
33. King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296 (1918).
34. Note (1945) 6 LoUISIANA LAW RECvEW 478.
35. Grantham v. Smith, 18 La. App. 519, 132 So. 805 (1931).
36. Gott v. Scott, 199 So. 460 (La. App. 1940); Fotj v. Myers, 8 So.(2d)
349 (La. App. 1942).
37. Kayser v. Van Nest, 125 Minn. 277, 146 N.W. 1091 (1914); Golden v.
Medford, 189 Ga. 614, 7 S.E.(2d) 236 (1940); King v. Cann, 182 Wash. 552,
52 P.(2d) 900 (1935)(although the son had been forbidden to let others
drive). But see Smith v. Sladovich, 3 La. App. 527 (1926)(suit dismissed
against owner whose major son permitted his friend to drive).
38. Wolfe v. Toye Bros. Auto and Taxicab Co., Inc., 18 La. App. 321, 138
So. 453 (1931); Weitkam v. Johnson, 5 So.(2d) 582 (La. App. 1942).
39. The owner, however, may render himself liable by lending his car
to an incompetent driver provided the former Is aware of this incompe-
tency. Baader v. Driverless Cars, Inc., 10 La. App. 310, 120 So. 515 (1929);
Anderson v. Driverless Cars, Inc., 11 La. App. 515, 124 So. 312 (1929); Davis
v. Shaw, 142 So. 301 (La. App. 1932); Bailey v. Simon, 199 So. 185 (La. App.
1940).
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